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NOTES 
Supreme Court Issues Notice to 
Courts: Bifurcated Proceedings      
Still Required 
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has made its preference for arbitration 
widely known through continued declarations of its policy to that effect.2  In 
KPMG v. Cocchi, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that preference once again.3  In 
that case, however, the Court also found a need to issue a reminder to lower courts 
that its decision in Dean Witter v. Byrd4 was still the law of the land.5  One of the 
most interesting questions arising from this clear reminder to adhere to precedent 
is why the Supreme Court felt the need to articulate it at all. 
The Court may have been spurred into action by its recognition of an old ju-
dicial hostility toward arbitration that still adheres in a number of jurisdictions 
today.  While some courts do little to hide their aversion to this method of dispute 
resolution, others harbor a more subtle distaste.  This note will discuss the possi-
ble motivations driving the Supreme Court in issuing its KPMG opinion, and 
whether this reminder to lower courts was necessary.  
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
The plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) in this case were nineteen entities and individuals, 
of whom fifteen were Florida residents,6 and all of whom purchased limited part-
nership interests in the Rye Funds.7  The Rye Funds consisted of a collection of 
funds operating as hedge funds8 and were managed by two entities: the Tremont 
 ___________________________  
 1. 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011). 
 2. See AT&T Mobility LLP v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Buckeye Check Cash-
ing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443-44 (2006); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Hall Street Assocs., LLP v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581-82 (2008). 
 3. See KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (noting that the Federal Arbitration Act 
exhibits a strong federal policy favoring arbitration as a method of resolving disputes). 
 4. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985). 
 5. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (holding that when a motion to 
compel arbitration was made, a court must grant it as to any arbitrable claims whether or not it would 
lead to bifurcated proceedings); see also KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 26 (“By not addressing the other 
two claims in the complaint, the Court of Appeal failed to give effect to the plain meaning of the Act 
and to the holding of .” (emphasis added)). 
 6. Brief of Respondent at 1, KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 7. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 24.  The Rye Funds consisted of a combination of three limited part-
nerships.  Id.   
 8. Initial Appellate Brief at 2-3, KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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Group Holding, Inc., and Tremont Partners, Inc. (collectively, “Tremont”).9  
KPMG,10 an independent auditor, was hired by Tremont to audit the Rye Funds’ 
financial statements.11  The Rye Funds invested with Bernard L. Madoff Invest-
ment Securities, a broker-dealer owned and operated by Bernie Madoff.12  This 
particular Rye Funds’ investment was involved in Madoff’s highly publicized 
Ponzi scheme13 which resulted in millions of alleged losses.14  Plaintiffs subse-
quently sued the Rye Funds, Tremont, and KPMG in a Florida circuit court.15   
Plaintiffs asserted four separate claims against KPMG in its complaint: 1) 
negligent misrepresentation; 2) violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 
Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA);16 3) professional malpractice; and 4) aiding and 
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.17  The core of Plaintiffs’ argument against 
KPMG was that KPMG did not use appropriate auditing standards in relation to 
the Rye Funds’ financial statements.18  KPMG made a motion in the circuit court 
to compel arbitration as provided for in the audit services agreement that existed 
between itself and Tremont.19  The contract contained an arbitration clause20 stat-
ing that disputes relating to services supplied by KPMG would be resolved by 
mediation or arbitration.21  KPMG argued in its motion that Plaintiffs’ claims 
arose as a result of the audit services KPMG performed under the contract and 
thus were derivative claims22 subject to the arbitration clause.23  The circuit court 
denied the motion24 without explanation.25 
 ___________________________  
 9. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 24.  Plaintiffs invested in the Rye Funds as limited partners.  Tremont 
acted as the general partner and manager of the funds.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
 10. KPMG is a worldwide system of professional firms offering tax, audit, and advisory services.  
KPMG employs over 145,000 employees that provide services in 152 countries across the globe.  
KPMG, https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/Pages/default.aspx.  
 11. Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 4. 
 12. Initial Appellate Brief, supra note 8, at 3. 
 13. See Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES.COM (Dec. 12, 2008, 
6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_1212croesus_inl.html.  
 14. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So.3d 1165, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  Tremont hired KPMG 
as auditor for the related financial statements and subsequently invested the funds with Madoff.  Brief 
of Respondent, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
 15. Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5.  Plaintiffs filed in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm 
Beach County in the state of Florida.  Id. 
 16. FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2010). 
 17. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24-25 (2011).  Plaintiffs, subsequent to the issuance of the 
appellate court decision, amended their complaint to add a fifth claim against KPMG.  Id. at 25. 
 18. Id. at 24. 
 19. Id. at 25. 
 20. Id. The clause stated that “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to . . . the services 
provided [by KPMG] . . . (including any dispute or claim involving any person or entity for whose 
benefit the services in question are or were provided) shall be resolved” by either mediation or arbitra-
tion. Id. 
 21. Id. The agreement afforded that mediation or arbitration would be the “sole” methods of dispute 
resolution authorized under the agreement.  Initial Appellate Brief at 3, KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 
So.3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).   
 22. The term “derivative liability” means that one's liability is "derived" from another’s liability and 
one person cannot be liable unless the other is liable as well. Anthony G. Buzbee, When Arbitrable 
Claims Are Mixed with Nonarbitrable Ones: What's a Court To Do?, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 663, 672 
(1998) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (6th ed. 1990)).   
 23. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So.3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  The parties agreed that Dela-
ware law would govern in deciding the issue of whether the claims were direct or derivative.  Id. at 
1168.  The test the Florida Court of Appeals used in deciding whether the Plaintiffs’ claims were direct 
or derivative was established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & 
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The Florida Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed, focusing large-
ly on the fact that the Plaintiffs did not expressly consent to the agreement that 
existed between KPMG and Tremont.26  The appellate court, applying Delaware 
law,27 found that the arbitration clause would be enforceable against Plaintiffs 
only if the Plaintiffs’ claims were derivative claims resulting from the services 
performed by KPMG pursuant to its agreement with Tremont.28  Concentrating 
exclusively on two of the four claims29 brought by the Plaintiffs against KPMG, 
the Florida court of appeals found the negligent misrepresentation and violation of 
FDUTPA claims were direct claims, rather than derivative claims.30  Based on this 
conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of KPMG’s mo-
tion to compel arbitration.31   
KPMG petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
which subsequently granted review.32  The Court addressed only the claims 
brought by the Plaintiffs against KPMG.33  The Court initially observed that the 
appellate court’s opinion did not mention either of Plaintiffs’ malpractice or 
breach of fiduciary claims, but rather centered exclusively on the Plaintiffs’ negli-
gent misrepresentation and violation of FDUTPA claims.34  Based on the appellate 
court’s failure to consider the two remaining claims, the Court found that the Flor-
ida court of appeals did not comply with the requirement of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) that it fully examine the complaint to evaluate whether any singu-
lar claim mandated arbitration in denying arbitration on the complaint as a 
whole.35  Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the holdings of the Florida 
 ___________________________  
Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) and involves asking the questions: “1) who suffered 
the harm, the corporation or the stockholders individually, and 2) who received the benefit of the 
recovery or remedy?”  Id.  To show direct harm under the Delaware test,  
 
[a] court should look to the nature of the wrong and to whom the relief should go. The stockhold-
er's claimed direct injury must be independent of any alleged injury to the corporation. The 
stockholder must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or 
she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.   
 
Id. at 1039.  
 24. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 25. 
 25. Initial Appellate Brief, supra note 8, at 9. 
 26. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 88 So. 3d 327, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 27. Both the Rye Funds and Tremont defendants were Delaware partnerships and all parties agreed 
that Delaware law applied to the transactions.  KPMG LLP, 51 So.3d at 1168. 
 28. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 25. 
 29. The appellate court addressed only the negligent misrepresentation and FDUTPA claims in its 
opinion.  It did not discuss the professional malpractice or aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary 
claims.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 25.  The Delaware test for determining when an action brought by limited partners was 
derivative or direct involved two questions: 1) who suffered the harm, limited partners individually or 
the corporation as a whole?; and 2) who got the benefit of the remedy or recovery?  Tooley v. Don-
aldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). 
 31. KPMG LLP, 51 So. 3d at 1168. 
 32. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 26. 
 33. Id. at 24.  The Court did not address Plaintiffs’ claims against Tremont nor the merits of Plain-
tiffs’ claims against KPMG.  
 34. Id. at 26.   
 35. Id.  The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, has been interpreted to require that when a com-
plaint consists of arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, courts must compel arbitration of the arbitrable 
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth District,36 finding that the appellate court had not 
given effect to the FAA’s plain meaning when it failed to address the two addi-
tional claims in the complaint.37  The Court therefore remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings to determine whether either of the two remaining claims mandat-
ed arbitration.38   
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Supreme Court has described Section 2 of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act as embracing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”39  Ac-
cordingly, the Court has repeatedly found that the FAA instructs that uncertainties 
relating to arbitration issues should be determined in favor of arbitration whenever 
possible.40  The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to require controversies 
to be arbitrated if a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.41  This 
obligation has been interpreted to cover controversies including both nonarbitrable 
and arbitrable claims, the latter compelling arbitration whether or not it leads to 
inefficient resolution of the overall dispute.42  Although this concept seems 
straightforward, up until the 1980s it had not always been uniformly applied 
among federal courts.43  This lack of uniformity led to the development of the 
intertwining doctrine, an approach that allows a trial court to try all arbitrable and 
nonarbitrable claims together when they are adequately factually intertwined.44  
The Supreme Court conclusively resolved the uncertainty permeating this area in 
1985 with its often-cited opinion in Dean Witter v. Byrd.45  This section will ad-
dress the rise and fall of the intertwining doctrine, as well as the FAA as it applies 
to multiple claim disputes that involve arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. 
 ___________________________  
claims when a party files a motion to compel regardless of whether the consequence is multiple pro-
ceedings in differing forums.  Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1985). 
 36. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 26. The order was given, and the per curiam opinion filed, on Novem-
ber 7, 2011. Id. at 23.  
 37. Id. at 26. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See AT&T Mobility LLP v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Buckeye Check Cash-
ing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443-44 (2006); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Hall Street Assocs., LLP v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581-82 (2008). 
 40. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 219; Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 
U.S. 49, 58 (2009).  
 41. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. Section 2 of the FAA has been interpreted as 
constructing a “body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,” which is to be applied to all arbitration 
agreement covered by the FAA. See id. 
 42. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 217. 
 43. Id. at 216-17 (discussing the split of authority among the circuits regarding what courts should 
do when faced with arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims in one petition). 
 44. Id.  
 45. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
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A. The Intertwining Doctrine 
Beginning with Wilko v. Swan,46 the Supreme Court took up the issue of what 
direction a court should take when a dispute presents arbitrable claims as well as 
nonarbitrable federal securities claims.47  In Wilko, a customer brought suit against 
a securities brokerage firm pursuant to the Federal Securities Act of 1933, alleging 
omissions and misrepresentations concerning stock transactions.48  The firm 
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement existing be-
tween the parties.49  The district court denied the motion, finding the agreement to 
arbitrate deprived the customer of certain statutory remedies.50  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed.51  The Supreme Court reversed again, rein-
stating the district court’s initial determination that arbitration was not required for 
the federal securities claim.52  Finding in favor of the customer, the Court ruled 
that the Federal Securities Act of 1933 provision concerning waiver of rights ap-
plied exclusively to the judicial process.53  The Court decided Congress’ intention 
regarding securities sales was better served by invalidating the arbitration agree-
ment at issue, even if the agreement would ordinarily be covered by the FAA.54  
The Wilko decision was interpreted differently among the federal courts, lead-
ing to a split among the circuits concerning what became known as the “intertwin-
ing doctrine.”55  Language in the Wilko opinion such as, “Congress [through the 
FAA] has afforded participants . . . an opportunity generally to secure prompt, 
economical and adequate solution of controversies through arbitration,”56 led 
some circuits to construe the FAA as demonstrating an overarching goal of effi-
cient dispute resolution, which could be best served by refusing to separate arbi-
trable and nonarbitrable claims the courts considered sufficiently “intertwined.”57   
Under the intertwining doctrine, when disputes containing arbitrable and 
nonarbitrable claims arise and are “sufficiently intertwined factually and legal-
ly,”58 the whole controversy may be tried together notwithstanding an agreement 
 ___________________________  
 46. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 
477 (1989). 
 47. Id. at 430. 
 48. Id. at 428-29.  
 49. Id. at 429. 
 50. Id. at 429-30. 
 51. Id. at 430. 
 52. Id. at 435, 438.  The Court was persuaded that the intention of Congress in including a nonwai-
vable provision in the Federal Securities Act was to put securities buyers on a different footing from 
other buyers and thus could not waive the ability to sue at a later time in an arbitration agreement.  Id. 
at 435. 
 53. Id. at 437 (“As the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial 
direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended § 14 to 
apply to waiver of judicial trial and review.”). 
 54. Id. at 435. 
 55. Compare Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir.1981); Belke v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982); Cunningham v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982) with Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 
1981); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 56. Wilko, 346 U.S. 438. 
 57. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).  
 58. Id. at 216-17. 
5
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to arbitrate.59  The court may use its discretion in determining whether claims are 
“sufficiently intertwined.”60  A court applying this doctrine hears the entire dis-
pute whether or not specific claims are subject to an arbitration agreement.61  A 
court rejecting this doctrine hears only those claims falling outside the arbitration 
agreement while ordering all arbitrable claims to proceed to arbitration.62   
The circuits adopting the intertwining doctrine63 asserted two reasons federal 
courts should refuse to compel arbitration in these circumstances.64  First, the 
circuits asserted that the doctrine was needed in order to conserve the court's “ex-
clusive jurisdiction over federal securities claims.”65  Otherwise, arbitration pre-
sented the possibility of state law claims being determined before the federal liti-
gation, resulting in collateral estoppel66 for facts determined in the arbitration.67  
Second, the supporting courts found the doctrine was needed for efficiency.68  
According to these supporting circuits, the doctrine would prevent bifurcated pro-
ceedings and litigation of identical fact questions when it declined to compel arbi-
tration.69  In contrast, the circuits which rejected the intertwining doctrine70 found 
that, in cases containing arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the FAA deprived 
federal courts of discretion concerning arbitration.71  These circuits found that the 
FAA required courts to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims when a party so 
moved, concluding that a court should not place its own notions of efficiency over 
those of Congress.72    
In an effort to resolve the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed and explicitly rejected the intertwining doctrine as to arbitration agree-
ments in Dean Witter v. Byrd by deciding that bifurcated proceedings did not cre-
ate a bar to compelling arbitration of any arbitrable claims covered in the agree-
ment.73   
 ___________________________  
 59. Id.; see also Belke, 693 F.2d 1023; Miley, 637 F.2d at 336; Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 58. 
 60. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 216-17. 
 61. Belke, 693 F.2d at 1026. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits embraced the doctrine, while the Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits declined its use.  Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 216-17. 
 64. Id. at 218. 
 65. Id. at 217. 
 66. Collateral estoppel is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments: “When an issue of fact 
or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is 
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 
whether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 67. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 217. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  See also Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023, 1026 (11th 
Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir.1981); Cunningham v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 580 (E.D. Cal. 1982). 
 70. See supra note 70 (identifying the circuits following as well as the circuits rejecting the doc-
trine). 
 71. See Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981); Surman v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 
717 F.2d 314, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 72. Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 646. 
 73. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 217-18. 
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B. Bifurcated Proceedings 
The FAA does not explicitly speak to whether the mandate to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements remains in force when bifurcated actions would result from the 
enforcement of such agreements.74  The Supreme Court, however, has construed 
Congress’ intent in passing the FAA to be that a court, when faced with a motion 
to compel arbitration, is obligated to grant that motion as to any arbitrable claims 
that exist.75 
The Supreme Court addressed which path courts should take when faced with 
claims containing arbitrable and nonarbitrable complaints in Dean Witter v. Byrd, 
while also resolving the split among the circuits concerning the intertwining doc-
trine.76  In Dean Witter, Byrd, an investor, brought suit alleging federal securities 
law and pendent state law violations by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., his securities 
broker.77  Dean Witter Reynolds moved to compel arbitration of the state law 
claims pursuant to its arbitration agreement with Byrd.78  The district court denied 
its motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.79  The Supreme Court thereafter re-
versed.80   
In Dean Witter, the Court observed that the FAA requires that courts must 
compel arbitration when dealing with a claim covered by an arbitration agree-
ment.81  Until Dean Witter, the Ninth Circuit82 had subscribed to the intertwining 
doctrine.83  The Court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s view that the FAA’s goal 
of efficient resolution of proceedings was a worthy ambition.84  Nonetheless, it 
reasoned that based on the FAA’s plain language mandating arbitration when a 
valid arbitration agreement exists as well as the Act’s legislative history,85 Con-
gress’ primary intent in passing the FAA was to enforce parties’ arbitration 
agreements, not simply to promote swift decision-making.86  The Court concluded 
that when a motion to compel arbitration is made, a court must grant it as to any 
arbitrable claims whether or not it would lead to bifurcated proceedings.87   
 ___________________________  
 74. Id. at 218-19. 
 75. Id. at 219. 
 76. Id. at 221. “[T]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private 
agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate, even if the result is “piecemeal” litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy 
manifested in another federal statute.” Id. 
 77. Id. at 214. 
 78. Id. at 215. 
 79. Id. at 215-16 
 80. Id. at 217. 
 81. Id. at 218. “By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, 
but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to 
which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Id. 
 82. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also subscribed to the intertwining doctrine.  Id. at 216-17. 
 83. Id.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 84. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 218-19.  
 85. According to the court, the legislative history of the FAA demonstrates that it was passed in an 
effort to guarantee judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements entered by private parties.  Id. at 221. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 220-21.  The Court also found that a stay of proceedings or joined proceedings was not 
necessary to protect the interests of the federal court proceeding because the collateral estoppel rules 
sufficiently protected those interests.  Id. at 222.  Thus, the Court stated that district courts should not 
 
7
Dixon: Dixon: Supreme Court Issues Notice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: Dixon 10.09 Created on:  10/9/2012 12:33:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:47:00 PM 
618 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2012 
 
As a result of Dean Witter, courts dealing with claims subject to arbitration 
under the FAA are now required to send those claims to arbitration whether or not 
all claims in the dispute are arbitrable.88     
III. INSTANT DECISION 
In a per curiam opinion,89 the United States Supreme Court addressed 
KPMG’s appeal of the denial of its motion to compel arbitration.  At the outset, 
the Court noted that arbitration agreements covered by the FAA require enforce-
ment in both federal and state courts.90  Thus, state courts perform an important 
function in enforcing these agreements.91  The Court observed that the FAA re-
quires that when a dispute involves some arbitrable claims and some nonarbitrable 
claims, the arbitrable claims must be arbitrated regardless of whether this results 
in bifurcated proceedings.92  Therefore, state and federal courts are obligated to 
diligently assess petitions so that they may divide arbitrable and nonarbitrable 
claims.93  Consistent with this directive, courts do not have license to deny arbitra-
tion purely because certain claims may be determined in litigation without arbitra-
tion.94  Following these comments, the Court addressed the denial of KPMG’s 
motion to compel arbitration. 
According to the Court, a review of the state court of appeals’ opinion sug-
gested that the appellate court did not determine individually whether all four95 of 
the Plaintiffs’ claims were arbitrable.96  KPMG argued that arbitration of the 
Plaintiffs’ claims was required because the audit services agreement between 
KPMG and Tremont was applicable to the Plaintiffs as well.97  The Court did not 
question the court of appeals’ finding that arbitration of the Plaintiffs’ claims was 
only appropriate if those claims were determined to have derived from the ser-
vices KPMG executed under the agreement for Tremont’s benefit.98  However, the 
Court did question the completeness of the appellate court’s analysis in reaching 
its decision that arbitration should not be compelled for the entire dispute.99  Ex-
amining the appellate court’s failure to address the nature of two of the Plaintiffs’ 
 ___________________________  
deny compelling arbitration in an effort to evade infringing on federal interests, even when it led to 
bifurcated proceedings.  Id. at 223. 
 88. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011). 
 89. Id. at 24. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (citing Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009)). 
 92. Id. (citing Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 217). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. The Plaintiffs’ claims against KPMG were negligent misrepresentation, FDUTPA violations, 
professional malpractice, and aiding a breach of fiduciary.  Id. 
 96. Id.  The court noted that the Florida Court of Appeals denied the motion to compel arbitration 
for any claim after deciding that two of Plaintiffs’ claims were not arbitrable.  Id.  
 97. Id. at 25. 
 98. Id.  The parties agreed the arbitrability of the claims turned on whether the claims were consid-
ered direct or derivative of the agreement between KPMG and Tremont.  Id. 
 99. See id. (noting that the question of which state’s law was to apply to the dispute was not at issue, 
but what was at issue was the appellate court’s failure to discern whether arbitration was required for 
any of the Plaintiffs’ four claims). 
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claims in its opinion,100 the Court found that the lower court failed in its duty to 
evaluate all claims separately for arbitrability.101            
Turning back to its discussion of the FAA, the Court remarked on the re-
sounding federal policy favoring arbitration.102  The Court found this policy de-
manded enforcement of parties’ arbitration agreements by courts.103  The matter at 
issue, as stated by the Court, was the evident refusal by the appellate court to 
compel arbitration as to any of the Plaintiffs’ four claims after its determination 
that two claims104 presented nonarbitrable issues.105   
The Court noted that the FAA states that written arbitration agreements con-
cerning disputes emerging out of a contract in existence are “valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable” except for reasons existing “at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”106  Relying heavily on its decision in Dean Witter v. Byrd,107 the 
Court observed that the FAA, by its terms, did not grant lower courts discretion in 
enforcing signed arbitration agreements, but rather ordered the parties to continue 
on to arbitration for arbitrable issues whenever possible.108  Hence, the Court stat-
ed, in the event a petition included arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, and a party 
filed a motion to compel, a court must compel arbitration of any arbitrable 
claims.109  According to the Court, this was true whether or not the consequence 
was “inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.”110  The 
Court, in reinforcing the predominant theme of its opinion, instructed that all 
courts were obligated to analyze each petition with precision in order to evaluate 
whether any specific claim contained therein required arbitration.111  If a court 
neglected this duty, a party denied its motion to compel arbitration was entitled to 
immediate review.112 
The Court, in finding that the appellate court failed to assess the arbitrability 
of all four of the Plaintiffs’ claims when it refused to compel arbitration as a 
whole after determining that two claims were nonarbitrable, held that the court of 
appeals abdicated the duty relegated to it under the FAA.113  Therefore, the Court 
 ___________________________  
 100. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims 
were direct or derivative.  Id. 
 101. Id.  The Court quoted the Court of Appeals’ opinion which found as the agreement as a whole 
that “the arbitral agreement upon which KPMG relied would not apply to the direct claims made by the 
individual plaintiffs.”  Id.  (quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So.3d 1165, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010)). 
 102. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)). 
 103. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985)).  The Court also noted 
that the FAA did not require courts to disregard state law in allowing written arbitration agreements to 
be enforced by or against nonparties (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630-31 
(2009)).  
 104. The two claims the appellate court determined were not arbitrable were the negligent misrepre-
sentation and FDUTPA violation claims. It did not address the malpractice or aiding a breach of fidu-
ciary duty claims. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 107. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
 108. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 25-26 (citing Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 218). 
 109. Id. at 26 (finding such a result was required by the FAA and its terms). 
 110. Id. (citing Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 217). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 265 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1984) as support for its proposition). 
 113. Id.  The Court also noted that the appellate court failed to follow the holding in Dean Witter as 
well as give plain meaning to the FAA.  Id. 
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vacated the appellate court’s denial of KPMG’s motion to compel arbitration and 
remanded the issue to the Florida Court of Appeal for the Fourth District to evalu-
ate whether either of the two unaddressed claims required arbitration.114 
IV. COMMENT  
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi is an example of the United States Supreme Court rein-
forcing its position that arbitrable claims must be arbitrated when a valid arbitra-
tion agreement exists between the parties.115  The question is why the Court felt it 
needed to issue this reminder in the first place.  The reason may have something to 
do with an old judicial hostility toward arbitration that still endures in some juris-
dictions today.116 
A. Lingering Hostility toward Arbitration 
Despite the long history of arbitration in the United States,117 judges early on 
displayed hostility toward arbitration agreements, often viewing such agreements 
as attempts to strip jurisdiction from the courts.118  That hostility has continued 
into the modern era.119  Some view the entire arbitration process as a second-class 
system offering only “an inferior brand of justice.”120  Specifically, judges may be 
especially hostile toward arbitration when there is a large disparity between the 
parties’ financial standings.121  This situation commonly arises when the dispute 
involves individuals and corporations.122   
 ___________________________  
 114. Id. 
 115. See Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221 (“[T]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act 
was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we 
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate[.]”). 
 116. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconsciona-
bility, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004) (suggesting that state and federal judges maintain, to some 
degree, the old judicial hostility toward arbitration). 
 117. See, e.g., 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER – LEGAL PAPERS 322-32 (A. Konofsky & A. King 
eds., 1982) (describing references to arbitration in New Hampshire as early as the eighteenth century).  
 118. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitra-
tion Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 393 (1987).  See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic 
Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C.L. REV. 931, 971 (noting 
that in colonial times arbitration was often used in industry-wide in a certain place to settle internal 
disputes).  An often cited example is that of the New York Chamber of Commerce which in 1768 
established an arbitration system aimed at settling business disputes in accord with local trade practice 
instead of legal principles.  This arbitration committee is thought to be the oldest committee in the 
United States today. 
 119. Fletcher, supra note 118, at 393-94. 
 120. See Frank E. Sander, H. William Allen & Debra Hensler, Alternative Dispute Resolution Sympo-
sium: Judicial (Mis)use of ADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 887-88 (1996); see also Sylvia 
Shaz Shweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging Settlements, 
20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 51, 54 (2007) (noting this may be especially true for indigent parties). 
 121. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution 
of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1490 (2008) (noting that many lower courts 
observe arbitration with skepticism, particularly as it relates to consumers). Bruhl also quoted one 
federal bankruptcy judge’s comments on arbitration in the consumer context: “The reality that the 
average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when 
he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises 
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Critics have argued that individuals are in a weaker position due to a lack of 
resources and the potential for biased arbitrators who seek recurring business with 
a specific corporation to avoid delivering decisions the corporation would view as 
unfavorable.123  Meanwhile, corporations are in a stronger position due to a famil-
iarity with the process and greater access to records and past decisions or awards 
that the individual will generally not be able to attain.124  Additional sources of 
judicial hostility may stem from the lack of usable precedent resulting from the 
private arbitration process125 and that arbitrated disputes almost always end in 
compromise, even when there seems to be a clear victor in the dispute.126  
In several recent cases,127 courts harboring this hostility have refused to en-
force arbitration agreements for a variety of reasons, such as finding them invalid 
under state contract law or for a lack of mutual assent.128  Recent empirical data129 
and qualitative evidence130 have caused a number of commentators and practition-
ers to propose that some courts have grasped upon state law contract defenses, 
particularly the unconscionability doctrine, as an excuse to invalidate arbitration 
agreements.131  However, other courts are not quite as obvious in displaying their 
hostility toward agreements to arbitrate disputes. 
In its KPMG LLP v. Cocchi opinion, the Florida Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth District, while not outright rejecting the Supreme Court’s mandate in Dean 
Witter, effectively ignored it when it deemed the entire dispute nonarbitrable, 
evincing its own brand of judicial hostility toward arbitration.  This passive-
 ___________________________  
as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.” Id. (quoting In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 
827-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999)).   
 122. Shweder, supra note 120, at 55. 
 123. Id. at 55-56. 
 124. Id. at 55. 
 125. Id. (noting that arbitration may result in important public issues evading the judicial process 
which in turn denies the common law a valuable source of progress). 
 126. Id. at 54-55 (citing Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 (1984)). 
 127. See, e.g., Manfredi v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 340 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (arbitra-
tion agreement invalid on unconscionability grounds); Newton v. Am. Debt Services, Inc., No. C–11–
3228 EMC, 2012 WL 581318 (N.D. Cal.  Feb. 22, 2012) (arbitration agreement unenforceable as a 
whole on grounds of unconscionability); Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 
383-84 (6th Cir. 2005) (mutual assent lacking); Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 
A.2d 656, 661-62 (Md. 2003) (lack of mutuality precludes enforcement of arbitration clause). 
 128. See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract 
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470 (2006).  Although the 
FAA states that valid arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforced unless a 
valid exception applies, state law contract defenses such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability may 
be used to invalidate such arbitration agreements without contravening the FAA.  Doctor's Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996).  
 129. See Randall, supra note 116, at 194-96 (recognizing an increase in the number of unconsciona-
bility claims raised in recent years by noting that judges are finding arbitration agreements uncon-
scionable at a rate twice that of nonarbitration agreements and that twenty years before the article was 
published, judges had found arbitration and nonarbitration agreements unconscionable at approximate-
ly equal rates). 
 130. See Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California's “Unique” Approach to Arbitration: 
Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 62 (2005) (noting that practitioners have started 
charging judges with generating a new type of unconscionability with a more rigorous standard that is 
special to the arbitration arena).    
 131. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1286 (2011); see 
also Burton, supra note 128, at 470.   
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aggressive evasion of federal policy was not lost on the Supreme Court.  In its 
KPMG opinion, the Court repeatedly noted the appellate court’s failure to even try 
to evaluate each of the claims individually for arbitrability,132 which the Court saw 
as being in conflict with the requirements of its precedent.133  By omitting any 
reference to the Dean Witter rule that petitions must be assessed as a whole before 
a motion to compel arbitration of the entire dispute may be denied, the Florida 
appellate court avoided a charge of outright disobedience to a Supreme Court 
mandate, but did not avoid suspicion as to its true preference for litigation over 
arbitration.  
It is mere speculation as to why the appellate court decided arbitration was an 
inadequate remedy for any of the individual claims in this case.  Perhaps the ap-
pellate court was hesitant to allow the parties to escape any judgment of fault and 
associated stigma attached to such a designation.134  Possibly, the Florida court of 
appeals considered the arbitration process unsuitable for this type of dispute due to 
the disparity in the parties’ economic positions.135  Or maybe that court just forgot 
to evaluate the other two claims.136  Without a definitive statement from the appel-
late court as to why it did not assess each individual claim, any assignment of 
underlying purpose would be guesswork.  Yet, the most probable inference to be 
drawn from reading the opinion authored by the Florida court of appeals is that it 
considered arbitration to be inadequate.137     
Presumably, this lack of certain knowledge as to the true motivations of the 
appellate court explains why the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the 
appellate court’s underlying reasons for determining that the entire dispute nonar-
bitrable.  Nevertheless, the tone of the Court’s opinion seems to suggest that the 
Justices were fully aware of the Florida court of appeals’ discontented outlook on 
 ___________________________  
 132. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 26 (2011) (noting that “[B]y not addressing the other two 
claims in the complaint, the Court of Appeal failed to give effect to the plain meaning of the Act and to 
the holding of Dean Witter.”). 
 133. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (“The preeminent concern of 
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that 
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is “piecemeal” 
litigation . . . .”). 
 134. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 358 n.24 (2006) (noting the stigma that may attach to punitive or compensa-
tory awards). 
 135. KPMG is a global company while the Plaintiffs are a collection of individuals who presumably 
would be in a weaker position in comparison.  See Bruhl supra, note 121 at 1490 (quoting Casarotto v. 
Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring), vacated sub nom. Doctor's 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995)). The Casarotto court illustrated the strong opinions 
judges may hold concerning arbitration in the consumer context:  
 
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary . . . to understand is that due to their misin-
terpretation of congressional intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their 
naive assumption that arbitration provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly bar-
gained for, [Montana's] laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick a 
choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed contract and require the party with 
inferior bargaining power to sign it. 
 
Id. 
 136. See KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 26 (noting that the Florida Court of Appeals only evaluated two of 
the four claims in the Plaintiffs’ petition). 
 137. See generally KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So.3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).   
12
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss2/8
File: Dixon 10.09 Created on: 10/9/2012 12:33:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:47:00 PM 
No. 2] Bifurcated Proceedings Still Required 623 
 
arbitration.138  While never overtly accusing the appellate court of unscrupulous 
behavior, the Court let it be known that this type of shirking of judicial duty would 
not go unnoticed. 
B. A Not So Subtle Reminder 
The Supreme Court’s decision in KPMG prompts an inquiry into whether 
there has been a possible resurgence in judicial hostility toward arbitration.  If the 
answer to that inquiry is yes, the next question concerns what exactly the Supreme 
Court was trying to remind lower courts of.  The Court seemed to be mandating 
that lower courts remember three important tenets of arbitration.  First, whether a 
claim is arbitrable or nonarbitrable is to be determined by the court.139  Second, 
when a dispute involves both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the court has a 
duty to decide which claims are arbitrable and which are not.140  Finally, and most 
importantly, this duty extends to consideration of each individual claim in the 
petition.141  By emphasizing lower courts’ lack of discretion in directing parties to 
continue on to arbitration for any claims covered by a valid arbitration agreement, 
the Court has made its policy preference for arbitration clear.142   
This policy preference may be seen by some as an attempt by the Court to 
manipulate parties into settlement of all claims.143  The impending time and mon-
ey obligations will most likely force parties to recognize the advantages to settle-
ment, whether or not this option is in both parties’ best interests.144   Courts are 
 ___________________________  
 138. For example, the opinion does not accuse the appellate court of intentional misapplication of the 
law, however it does appear to question the motives of the lower court: “Though the matter is not 
altogether free from doubt, a fair reading of the opinion indicates a likelihood that the Court of Appeal 
failed to determine whether the other two claims in the complaint were arbitrable.”  KPMG LLP, 132 
S. Ct. at 24 (emphasis added); see also id. at 25 (“A fair reading of the opinion reveals nothing to 
suggest that the court came to the same conclusion about the professional malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims. Indeed, the court said nothing about those claims at all.”) (emphasis added); and 
id. (“What is at issue is the Court of Appeal's apparent refusal to compel arbitration on any of the four 
claims based solely on a finding that two of them . . . were nonarbitrable.”) (emphasis added). 
 139. AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (“[T]he question of 
arbitrability . . . is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.  Unless the parties clearly and unmis-
takably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by 
the court, not the arbitrator.”). 
 140. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The preeminent concern of 
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that 
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ 
litigation . . . .”). 
 141. KPMG LLP, 132 S. Ct. at 26 (“[C]ourts must examine a complaint with care to assess whether 
any individual claim must be arbitrated.  The failure to do so is subject to immediate review . . . .” 
(citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1984)). 
 142. See AT&T Mobility LLP v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011) (“Section 2 reflects a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration”).    
 143. See Shweder, supra note 120, at 57 (2007) (noting that parties should not “feel coerced into 
settling in lieu of litigation”).  
 144. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).  Fiss opines: 
  
Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the bargain 
may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subse-
 
13
Dixon: Dixon: Supreme Court Issues Notice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: Dixon 10.09 Created on:  10/9/2012 12:33:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:47:00 PM 
624 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2012 
 
often clogged and arbitration, though generally quicker and less expensive than 
litigation,145 still requires the parties to commit many hours and extensive re-
sources before an outcome is reached.146  Thus, many parties, when weighing the 
pros and cons of continuing on to multiple proceedings, will often find that set-
tlement is the most viable option.   
However, a policy encouraging arbitration, and also settlements, is not neces-
sarily a bad thing.  By strictly enforcing agreements to arbitrate, the courts are 
giving effect to the parties’ expectations and also respecting the parties’ right to 
contract.147  Moreover, an increase in the number of settlements helps eliminate 
strains on the already overtaxed court system.148   Often arbitration will result in 
parties resolving their disputes earlier, and at lower cost, than would be possible if 
litigation, or even arbitration, were carried to their natural ends.149  This allows the 
parties to receive relief faster,150 a factor that could be important to consumers, 
especially in today’s economic climate.151   
This aspect may also play a significant role in the case of bifurcated proceed-
ings.  If one proceeding is completed before the other is resolved—the most likely 
scenario being that the arbitration finishes before the litigation—this may allow 
one party to obtain relief while the other proceeding is still pending.152  Obviously 
 ___________________________  
quent judicial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be 
done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and 
should be neither encouraged nor praised. 
 
Id. 
 145. See Karen A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Agree-
ments, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337, 337 (2001) (noting that “many parties favor arbitration because it is 
typically more efficient, more private, and less costly than litigation”). 
 146. See Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural Values Shape Our Disputing 
Processes, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 308 (2005) (noting that in commercial arbitration lawyers’ in-
volvement has increased and as a result arbitration time and costs have increased as well). 
 147. See Sasser, supra note 145, at 346. 
 148. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiffs Autonomy and the 
Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 810 (1989). 
 149. See Shweder, supra note 120, at 53 (noting that alternative dispute resolution methods help to 
lower the parties’ costs and time expenses by resolving cases more quickly and easing the burdens on 
the judicial system).  
 150. However, “most arbitration awards are not self-executing” and generally a court must confirm 
the award.  This converts the award into a judgment that can be enforced with judicial powers.  Alden 
L. Atkins and Adrianne Goins, New York Courts Make it Easier to Seize Assets To Satisfy an Award, 
16 NO. 2 IBA ARB. NEWS 143, 144 (Sept. 2011). 
 151. See Lance Roberts, Voices: Lance Roberts, On the 2012 Recession, Financial Advisor, THE 




Since the end of the recession in 2009, we’ve had an economy that [has] been built on inventory 
restocking and Federal Reserve intervention. In the meantime, the cost of living has risen and 
wages have stayed the same. Food and energy alone are eating up 20% of the average Ameri-
can’s income. 
 
Id. See also Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal 
Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 603 (2010) (noting that the recent eco-
nomic recession has resulted in a decline in the demand for legal services). 
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the recipient of relief benefits from this occurrence, but there may also be a recip-
rocal, yet noticeably less attractive, benefit to the payor: the ability to spread pay-
ments out over time if the payor later has a judgment rendered against him pursu-
ant to the litigation.   
Arbitration may put justice within reach of parties who, due to circumstances 
such as a lack of legal knowledge or accessible resources, find litigation infeasi-
ble.153  Also, because there are some important similarities between arbitration and 
litigation, parties can avoid the expense of trial while still retaining many of the 
benefits of litigation, such as giving the parties a chance to tell their story and 
having access to a neutral fact finder who will ultimately render a binding deci-
sion.154  An additional advantage is that parties can hire arbitrators who have spe-
cial knowledge with regard to a certain body of law, thus reducing the amount of 
time required for explanation of the relevant industry.155  Further, these arbitrators 
will be more equipped to recognize either party’s attempt to conceal or sugarcoat 
certain facts than their jury counterparts.156     
The Supreme Court, whether or not intending to directly influence the deci-
sion of parties to continue on to arbitration and litigation, has at least indirectly 
shaped parties’ choices in that regard by requiring bifurcated proceedings if arbi-
trable and nonarbitrable claims exist in one petition.  The Supreme Court has been 
faced with a tradeoff between judicial efficiency in hearing disputes in a single 
proceeding and a party’s constitutional right to access to the courts on the one 
hand, and respect of the parties’ right to contract and earlier access to relief on the 
other.  As this comment illustrates, the arguments on either end of the issue are 
persuasive.  Yet, as evidenced by the Court’s affirmance of its position to require 
arbitration of arbitrable claims regardless of whether it results in bifurcated pro-
ceedings, the Court has weighed both sides of the balance and chosen to adhere to 
its longstanding policy of favoring arbitration and to encourage non-judicial 
methods of resolving disputes.   
Whether the lower courts will fall in line with the Supreme Court’s clear 
preference for arbitrability in all respects, or continue to demonstrate a latent hos-
tility toward arbitration, is yet to be seen.  However, after the Supreme Court’s 
reminder in KPMG that all arbitrable claims are to be compelled to arbitration 
 ___________________________  
[i]f the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon 
the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within 
one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified 
for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the 
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no 
court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the Unit-
ed States court in and for the district within which such award was made.   
 
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). 
 153. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 118, at 958 (noting that the technicality of the judicial process 
may make it more difficult for everyday persons to understand their rights). 
 154. See Shweder, supra note 120, at 54 (noting that parties may sometimes impede negotiations 
when left on their own to resolve disputes because they are reluctant to accept an offer from an adver-
sary and the use of a neutral third party can reduce this tendency thus encouraging resolution of dis-
putes).  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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regardless of the lack of efficiency it may create, at least in this area, courts will 
find it much more difficult to avoid the Supreme Court’s clear mandate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted a clear reminder to 
courts that each claim in a dispute involving an arbitration agreement must be 
evaluated individually for arbitrability, and if arbitrable claims exist the parties 
must be compelled to arbitrate those claims upon motion by either party.  The 
Court may have felt the need to issue this directive due to an underlying hostility 
to arbitration still evident in many jurisdictions.157  Although the Supreme Court 
has continually heralded the advantages of alternative dispute resolution methods, 
such as lower monetary and time costs, clearing of dockets, and respect of parties’ 
right to contract, some courts are still resistant to these practices.  To truly eradi-
cate those courts’ hostility toward ADR in general, it may take more than a few 
gentle reminders from the Court.  However, until a more forceful step is taken in 
this effort, by either the Supreme Court or Congress, the subtle prodding of courts 
to fulfill their duties, as articulated in the KPMG opinion, may have to do. 
VALERIE DIXON 
 
 ___________________________  
 157. See Randall, supra note 116, at 186 (noting that federal and state judges maintain some level of 
judicial hostility concerning arbitration.) 
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